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Abstract: We analyze the extent to which the EU-15 and 16 transition economies used the WTO 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to commit to service sector policy reforms. 
GATS commitments are compared with the evolution of actual policy stances over time. While 
there is substantial variance across transition economies on both actual policies and GATS 
commitments, we find an inverse relationship between the depth of GATS commitments and the 
“quality” of actual services policies as assessed by the private sector. In part this can be 
explained by the fact that the prospect of EU accession makes GATS less relevant as a 
commitment device for a subset of transition economies. However, for many of the non-EU 
accession candidates the WTO seems to be a weak commitment device. One explanation is that 
the small size of the markets concerned generates weak external enforcement incentives. Our 
findings suggest greater collective investment by WTO members in monitoring and transparency 
is needed to increase the benefits of WTO membership to small countries. 
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Services Policies in Transition Economies: On the EU and WTO as 
Commitment Mechanisms 
 
Services have become increasingly important as a vehicle to generate economic growth, 
reflecting increasing specialization and exchange of services through markets, with an associated 
increase in variety and quality and a reduction in real costs. The competitiveness of firms—both 
domestic enterprises operating in and for the local market and exporters operating in 
international markets—depends on the availability, cost, and quality of services such as finance, 
transport, telecommunications, health services and education. Technological change has also 
made services increasingly tradable internationally, further increasing the scope for 
specialization in production and trade. One implication is that services now figure in trade 
agreements, the primary instrument through which governments negotiate better access to 
foreign markets for national firms. 
  Transition economies in Europe and Central Asia have undertaken numerous policy 
reforms in the services area. All had very small service sectors before 1990, reflecting the 
emphasis under central planning on industry and the bias against “immaterial” service sector 
activities. The question explored in this paper is the extent to which trade agreements were used 
as focal points or commitment devices for service sector policy reform. A common argument in 
the literature on regional integration and trade agreements more generally is that a rationale for 
participating in such agreements is to improve the terms of trade (“mercantilism”) (see e.g., 
Bagwell and Staiger 2003). This has always been more difficult to argue in the case of small 
countries, where an alternative, political economy-based hypothesis is more likely: trade 
agreements offer a mechanism for governments to signal their commitment to a particular policy 
path (Tumlir, 1985). Transition economies in particular, with a very limited track record on 
maintaining an open policy stance, can be expected to have had strong incentives to use 
membership of trade agreements for such credibility purposes. In addition, given very limited 
experience with market-based service sector policies, trade agreements may also have been 
valuable by establishing a template of (minimum) standards for trade and investment policy in 
the services area. 
  Three options were available: WTO membership and associated commitments; trade 
agreements with Western economies, in particular the EU, with the prospect of potential 
accession for Central European states; and trade agreements with neighbors and other formerly   2
planned economies. Given that most transition economies had small market-oriented service 
sectors, the last type of agreement is unlikely to have been seen as a useful lock-in or signaling 
device. This paper therefore focuses on the two major options: the WTO and the EU. We explore 
to what extent trade agreements were used as commitment devices for services policies by 
comparing countries in terms of their participation in and use of agreements to commit to 
services policy openness and relating commitments made to actual policies applied, as well as 
the changes in actual policies over time. Our interest is in part to determine whether there are 
common or consistent differences between the set of countries that were and that were not EU 
accession candidates, and more specifically, given that the EU is a deep integration agreement, 
whether the WTO could play a similar role as a focal point/lock-in mechanism as the EU for 
those countries where EU accession is not in the cards. Another question of interest is whether 
transition economies – both accession candidates and others – had caught up with the European 
Union in terms of liberalization of services markets as of 2004. Even for recent accession 
countries this is not a redundant question as the EU is not (yet) a true common market for 
services. 
  The paper starts with a discussion of service sector commitments made by the European 
Union in the GATS. Descriptive statistics are generated on the extent to which EU members 
(EU-15) made market access and national treatment commitments in the GATS. We characterize 
average EU commitments and the variance between the schedules of each member state, and 
assess to what extent EU offers in the context of the Doha Round negotiations as of end 2004 
would move the EU towards greater liberalization and uniformity. In Section 2 the same 
descriptive exercise is undertaken for 16 transition economies that are WTO members, including 
a determination whether their commitments go beyond those of the EU. Section 3 assesses trends 
in the actual policies pursued by the transition economies, and compares these to the index of 
GATS commitments. We find that the 16 countries can be divided into different groups on the 
basis of actual policies/GATS commitments: countries that have better applied policies but have 
weak GATS schedules (mostly EU accession candidates); countries with good policies and high 
GATS commitment indices (again many EU accession candidates), and a group of countries that 
have weak policies and are relatively closed in practice but that did make extensive GATS 
commitments. In the last group actual policies have become worse over time or else not 
improved as rapidly as in other transition countries.    3
For EU accession candidates the GATS is largely redundant as a commitment device. 
The difference in the use of the GATS across the countries with the best actual policies is largely 
explained by the timing of accession to the WTO. GATT-1947 members made much fewer 
commitments than countries that acceded to the WTO after 1995. Given that accession to the 
WTO became a much more demanding process than was the case for the GATT-1947, this 
finding is not surprising – it confirms the conventional wisdom. However, our third finding 
suggests the conventional wisdom may need to be revisited in an important respect as it assumes 
that multilateral disciplines are applied. In practice, we find an inverse relationship between the 
level of GATS commitment and the “quality” of actual policy. This may reflect the fact that 
WTO commitments are not enforced because of the small size of the markets of the countries 
concerned – no WTO member has much of an incentive to bring a dispute settlement case 
forward.  
This finding suggests the argument in the literature regarding the lock-in and credibility 
benefits of membership of and making commitments in trade agreements may need to be 
qualified. External enforcement incentives may be weak in cases of noncompliance by 
small/poor countries, as foreign exporters may perceive the net return of initiating disputes or 
invoking WTO disciplines to be inadequate. In such circumstances internal enforcement of 
national GATS commitments by affected constituencies is the primary vehicle to ensure 
implementation. Such groups could be assisted through more effective multilateral monitoring of 
implementation of commitments. The additional information and “legitimacy” created by greater 
multilateral transparency may also help increase the perceived relevance of the GATS to 
stakeholders in small counties that have to date made only limited use of the GATS. 
 
1. The EU in the GATS: Uruguay Round Commitments and Doha Round Offers 
Before discussing GATS commitments and the actual policies of transition economies, we focus 
on the EU schedules of services commitments in order to provide a baseline for comparison 
purposes. The EU is in theory a common market with a common external trade policy. A 
common external tariff has long been in place for the EU. However, it remains an open question 
to what extent member states have a common structure of protection for the services sector. In 
practice this is very difficult to determine because the EU does not have common external   4
services policies – in a number of sectors, members retain national competence. This is clearly 
reflected in the commitments that were made by EU members in the GATS. 
What follows uses the simple index score from 0 to 100 as proposed by Hoekman (1996) 
to characterize GATS commitments. It assigns a value of 1 to full commitment to liberalization 
(“none” in GATS terminology – i.e., no exceptions or limitations to market access or national 
treatment); 0.5 (partial) to specific limitations; and 0 (“unbound”) to instances where no 
commitments at all are made for a sub-sector. An index score of 100 for a given mode of supply 
implies that there is full commitment to liberalization in all of the 155 sub sectors distinguished 
by the GATS, a score of 0 means that there is no commitment in any sector at all, i.e. all sectors 
are classified as ‘unbound’. Essentially all scores obtained in each of the 155 sub sectors are 
added up and converted into a percentage of 155, so that 155 is set equal to 100. Thus, 100 is the 
maximum score possible and implies full liberalization in all sectors. Annex table 1 provides 
detailed information on how the qualitative information displayed in the GATS schedules is 
translated into index scores. The index used is a somewhat arbitrary measure of the depth of 
commitments in that its value is unlikely to be very informative of the actual policies that 
prevail. Moreover, although there is greater commonality among the set of transition economies 
than would be the case for a random sample of countries, similar values do not necessarily imply 
similar levels of openness, as no effort is made to map commitments by sector across countries. 
As noted by Hoekman (1996), only if there are no limitations on national treatment and 
market access is there a clear policy commitment. In other instances, actual policy may be quite 
restrictive or quite open. Thus, the value of 0.5 does not distinguish between severe and minor 
trade restrictions. Similarly, commitments of the ‘unbound’ type do not necessarily imply that 
major restrictions apply – it simply denotes the fact that governments retain discretion regarding 
the use of policies. What the index does do is provide one – arbitrary – way of weighting 
commitments and allowing cross-country comparisons, thus permitting an assessment of the 
degree to which there is uniformity in GATS commitments across EU members.  
What follows assesses (a) the current formal degree of service sector openness reflected 
in the commitments made by EU countries in the GATS, (b) the extent to which members 
deviate from the EU “baseline” by imposing country-specific restrictions, (c) the degree of 
uniformity across member states’ commitments, and (d) the extent to which greater convergence 
is implied by the offers made by the EU and its members as of 2004 in the context of the Doha   5
Round. Table 1 presents an assessment of currently applicable GATS commitments for the EU-
15. The relevant schedules are those of the EU-12 and the national ones of Austria, Sweden, and 
Finland plus respective sector-specific updates for the EU-15 as a whole. As the GATS 
distinguishes between four modes of supply: cross-border trade; consumption abroad (for 
example, tourism); commercial presence (FDI); and the temporary movement of people 
providing services to clients abroad – national treatment and market access commitments are 
mode-specific. The benchmark score for the EU as a whole is a constructed baseline that is used 
to assess to what extent each EU member state imposes country-specific restrictions. The pre-
Doha level of commitment for the EU-15 as a whole was 47 percent (top of last column of table 
1) when measured as an average across the 8 (2 times 4 modes) “cells” for which commitments 
can be made for each of the 155 sub-sectors distinguished in the GATS. Most EU members do 
not deviate much from this average “benchmark” in terms of national commitments across 
modes. At 46 percent, the EU weighted average is only one percentage point below the 
benchmark value.  
Table 1: Commitments of EU and EU Member States in GATS by Mode of Supply 
  Market Access  National Treatment  MA + NT   
               Mode:  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  All 
EU*    52.6 68.1 67.1  0.0  52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0  52.4 68.2 67.3  0.0  47.0
Belgium  51.0 68.1 64.2  0.3  51.0 68.4 67.4 1.0  51.0 68.2 65.8  0.6  46.4
Germany  51.6 66.8 65.5  1.0  50.3 67.7 67.1 0.6  51.0 67.3 66.3  0.8  46.3
Denmark  51.3 67.1 65.8  2.6  51.9 68.4 65.8 3.9  51.6 67.7 65.8  3.2  47.1
Spain  51.0 68.1 59.7  1.3  52.3 68.4 67.4 1.9  51.6 68.2 63.5  1.6  46.3
France  49.4 67.4 57.1  6.5  50.6 68.4 66.5 1.0  50.0 67.9 61.8  3.7  45.8
Greece  45.2 67.4 56.1  9.0  49.4 68.4 66.8 0.0  47.3 67.9 61.5  4.5  45.3
Italy  46.8 67.7 57.4  2.9  47.1 68.4 66.5 7.7  46.9 68.1 61.9  5.3  45.6
Ireland  50.6 68.1 63.5  0.0  51.0 68.4 67.4 0.0  50.8 68.2 65.5  0.0  46.1
Luxembourg  52.6 68.1 66.8  0.0  52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0  52.4 68.2 67.1  0.0  46.9
Netherlands  52.6 68.1 66.8  0.0  52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0  52.4 68.2 67.1  0.0  46.9
Portugal  43.5 67.7 51.0  2.9  49.0 68.4 67.1 4.2  46.3 68.1 59.0  3.5  44.2
UK  52.6 67.7 66.1  0.0  52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0  52.4 68.1 66.8  0.0  46.8
Austria  55.8 68.7 64.8  8.7  53.5 68.7 67.7 10.0 54.7 68.7 66.3  9.4  49.8
Sweden  47.4 60.0 50.0  0.6  48.1 60.0 53.5 1.9  47.7 60.0 51.8  1.3  40.2
Finland  51.3 58.7 52.3  0.6  52.6 58.7 56.8 36.1 51.9 58.7 54.5 18.4 45.9
Standard deviation   3.2  3.0  6.1  3.1  1.8 3.2 4.3 9.2 2.4 3.1 4.7 4.9 2.0 
Mean  50.2 66.6 60.5  2.4  50.9 67.2 65.5 4.6  50.5 66.9 63.0  3.5  46.0
* “EU” is an artificial benchmark schedule that ignores country-specific factors. 
The calculated numbers represent the percentage of committed sectors in the total, weighted by the type 
of binding (full, partial, unbound). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The fewest commitments were made for mode 4 (temporary movement of natural persons 
supplying services), with an average of 3.5 percent. Mode 4 is generally subject to numerous 
restrictions by most governments due to fears of an influx of too much unskilled labor. Mode 4 is 
followed by mode 1 (cross border trade) with 50.5 percent. The level of commitments on modes 
2 (consumption abroad) and 3 (commercial presence) are the highest and quite similar, in the 60-
65 percent range. This pattern of commitments matches quite well with what would be expected 
on standard political economy grounds – modes 1 and 4 are the modes that are of greatest export 
interest to developing countries, and where there is domestic (EU) interest group-based 
opposition to liberalization. If the focus is on specific commitments by EU member states, the 
greatest variance with the EU average commitment is found for mode 3. France, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Finland and Sweden score 10 or more percentage points below the benchmark for the 
level of bound market access. The standard deviation of the commitments is twice as high for 
mode 3 commitments as for other modes on market access. This pattern reveals that although 
modes 1 and 4 are more “sensitive” for all countries, within the EU there were different 
sensitivities on mode 3. Annex table 2 reports the sectoral breakdown of the summary indicators 
reported in table 1 – health, transport and cultural services tend to be among sectors where the 
fewest commitments are made.  
Table 2 matches the proposals (offers) EU countries made in the Doha Round as of 2003-
2004 against the prevailing GATS regime that is summarized in table 1. These data cover the 
most recent proposals to the extent that they were officially published and are not just snapshots 
of current trade negotiations as debated in the media. We thus implicitly treat any additional 
proposal as unofficial. The data in table 2 are drawn from an analysis by Langhammer (2005) 
and reflect the same methodological approach as in table 1, i.e. the Hoekman commitment index.  
The offer made by the EU substantially increases the average commitment index from 46 to 
slightly above 58 percent. At the aggregate level the standard deviation would fall from 2 to 1.6, 
indicating an increase in uniformity at the EU member state level. In terms of the various modes, 
commitments in mode 4 improve but remain far below that in other modes. Only Finland’s offer 
on mode 4 is far-reaching, but only for national treatment. On market access it is similar to most 
other EU countries on mode 4.  The relative ranking of the “sensitivity” of the four modes 
remains the same. In relative terms the smallest expansion in commitment levels occurs for mode 
1, presumably reflecting the concerns about outsourcing that emerged during the early years of   7
the Doha round. In contrast to mode 1, the increase in the proposed level of bindings for modes 2 
and 3 is significant, rising to over 80 percent. For mode 3 market access commitments the 
variance across EU members would fall, but the structure of commitments remains similar to the 
pre-Doha status quo, i.e., the “lagging” countries are mostly the same – only Greece would 
converge to the EU average as a result of the offers that were on the table as of 2004. However, 
in all cases where national sensitivities on mode 3 appear to remain, the level of proposed 
commitments on mode 3 is substantially higher than for mode 1. 
 
Table 2: EU Member GATS Offers by Mode of Supply in the Doha Round, 2003-2004 
  Market Access  National Treatment  MA + NT   
               Mode:  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  All 
EU*  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Belgium 57.1  89.4  84.5 0.4  56.6 90.3 86.7 2.2  56.9 89.9  85.6  1.3  58.4
Germany 56.6  87.6  81.9 1.8  55.3 88.5 85.0 2.2  56.0 88.1  83.5  2.0  57.4
Denmark 60.2  89.4  85.4 2.7  59.3 90.3 84.5 4.4  59.8 89.9  85.0  3.6  59.5
Spain 57.5  89.8  78.3 1.3  57.5 90.3 86.7 1.3  57.5 90.1  82.5  1.3  57.8
France 51.8  88.5  79.2 9.7  54.0 90.3 84.5 2.7  52.9 89.4  81.9  6.2  57.6
Greece 55.8  89.4  83.6 4.9  54.9 90.3 85.8 0.9  55.4 89.9  84.7  2.9  58.2
Italy 50.4  88.9  77.0 5.3  49.1 90.3 85.4 9.3  49.8 89.6  81.2  7.3  57.0
Ireland 56.6  89.9  85.8 0.0  55.8 90.3 86.7 0.9  56.2 90.1  86.3  0.5  58.3
Luxembourg 61.5  89.8  86.7 0.4  60.2 90.3 86.7 0.9  60.9 90.1  86.7  0.7  59.6
Netherlands 59.7  89.8  86.7 0.0  58.4 90.3 86.7 0.9  59.1 90.1  86.7  0.5  59.1
Portugal 54.0  89.9  74.8 2.7  53.1 90.3 84.1 6.6  53.6 90.1  79.5  4.7  56.9
UK 60.6  89.9  86.7 3.5  59.3 90.3 86.7 0.9  60.0 90.1  86.7  2.2  59.7
Austria 65.5  87.2  82.3 6.2  62.4 88.1 85.0 1.8  64.0 87.7  83.7  4.0  59.8
Sweden 57.5  80.5  74.3 1.3  56.6 81.4 74.8 3.1  57.1 81.0  74.6  2.2  53.7
Finland  58.8 77.0 74.3 0.9  58.8 78.3 75.2 57.1 58.8 77.7 74.8 29.0 60.1
Standard deviation   3.8  3.8  4.7  2.8  3.3 3.7 3.9  14.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 7.1 1.6 
Mean 57.6  87.8  81.4 2.7  56.8 88.6 84.3 6.3  57.2 88.2  82.9  4.5  58.2
* “EU” is an artificial benchmark schedule that does not have country-specific factors. 
The calculated numbers represent the percentage of committed sectors in the total, weighted by the type 
of binding (full, partial, unbound). 
Source: Langhammer (2005). 
 
2. The Pattern of GATS Commitments of Transition Economies  
The transition economies on which this paper focuses are a very heterogeneous group of 
countries. They range from central European EU accession countries to landlocked, small 
Central Asian countries that were members of the Soviet Union. Some were already GATT-1947 
contracting parties (Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Yugoslavia), 
but most were not. Some are proximate to the EU-15, sharing a common border. In what follows 
we divide the 16 countries into four groups: (a) the major Central European EU accession   8
candidate countries – all of which were GATT members in 1994, the year before the creation of 
the WTO; (b) other EU accession countries; (c) South-Eastern European countries; and (d) the 
remaining set of countries, all of which belonged to the former Soviet Union. Note that group (b) 
also includes some ex-USSR members – the Baltic states.  
Table 3 displays the GATS commitment indices for these 4 sub-groups of transition 
economies, using the same methodology as in tables 1 and 2. Group (a) comprises the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. All were GATT-1947 contracting parties 
and had GATS schedules that took effect in 1994 and were revised subsequently to include 
additional commitments in the financial services and telecom sectors. Hungary has the highest 
commitment index (44 percent), followed by the Czech and the Slovak Republics (about 30 
percent each) and Poland, with about 24 percent. The relatively low level of the commitment 
index for the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Poland is somewhat surprising given that 
all three countries were preparing to join the EU at the time of submitting the schedules. The 
high percentage of unbound commitments is also striking. The four other EU accession countries 
(group b) display higher average levels of GATS commitments. Latvia is the frontrunner, with 
about 59 percent, followed by Lithuania (47 percent) and Estonia (44 percent). The outlier is 
Slovenia, which joined the GATT in 1994, with a commitment index that is similar to that of the 
Central European countries that were GATT-1947 members – around 30 percent. The schedules 
date from 1995 (Slovenia); 1999 (Estonia and Latvia); and 2001 (Lithuania).  
In group (c), the South Eastern European countries, Croatia (49 percent) and Macedonia 
(42 percent) have higher commitment levels than Bulgaria (26 percent) and Romania (25 
percent).  Of these countries, Romania was a GATT-1947 contracting party, so that its GATS 
schedule was submitted in 1994. Schedules for the other countries were submitted in 1997 
(Bulgaria), 2000 (Croatia), and 2004 (FYR Macedonia).  
The four former republics of the Soviet Union (group d) all committed themselves to a 
strikingly high degree of market access and nondiscrimination. Moldova is the leader, with 78 
percent, followed by Kyrgyzstan (59 percent), Georgia (54 percent), and Armenia (42 percent). 
The schedules were submitted in 1999 (the Kyrgyz Republic), 2000 (Georgia), 2001 (Moldova), 
and 2004 (Armenia). 
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Table 3: GATS Commitments of Transition Economies by Mode of Supply 
  Market Access  National Treatment  MA + NT   
                   Mode :  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  All 
Czech Republic  31.6  48.7  31.9 0.3  38.1 53.5 41.6 0.6  34.8 51.1  36.8  0.5  30.8
Hungary 50.6  61.0  58.1 1.3  60.0 61.9 61.9 0.0  55.3 61.5  60.0  0.6  44.4
Poland 21.0  26.5  26.5 4.5  23.5 29.0 35.2 30.0 22.3 27.7  30.8  17.3 24.5
Slovak Republic  32.6  50.3  33.2 0.0  38.7 56.1 41.6 0.0  35.6 53.2  37.4  0.0  31.6
Estonia 57.1  62.9  59.0 0.0  56.8 62.6 54.2 1.9  56.9 62.7  56.6  1.0  44.3
Latvia 50.6  73.2  70.0 1.6  58.1 73.5 73.2 72.3 54.4 73.4  71.6  36.9 59.1
Lithuania 53.9  68.7  60.3 0.0  55.5 68.4 65.5 1.6  54.7 68.5  62.9  0.8  46.7
Slovenia 30.3  45.2  41.6 0.3  34.8 48.7 47.4 0.6  32.6 46.9  44.5  0.5  31.1
Croatia 49.0  70.6  68.7 0.3  55.5 74.8 74.5 0.6  52.3 72.7  71.6  0.5  49.3
Macedonia 41.6  62.3  54.2 0.0  52.6 64.8 61.0 0.6  47.1 63.5  57.6  0.3  42.1
Bulgaria 21.3  38.4  35.5 4.8  26.1 41.0 42.6 1.3  23.7 39.7  39.0  3.1  26.4
Romania 25.2  30.3  31.9 0.0  25.8 31.6 33.5 21.9 25.5 31.0  32.7  11.0 25.0
Armenia 40.0  64.5  55.8 0.0  46.5 64.5 63.9 0.0  43.2 64.5  59.8  0.0  41.9
Georgia 62.6  76.8  73.2 0.0  64.5 76.8 74.2 0.0  63.5 76.8  73.7  0.0  53.5
Kyrgyzstan 80.6  82.6  74.5 0.0  80.6 82.6 73.5 0.0  80.6 82.6  74.0  0.0  59.3
Moldova 86.1  87.7  85.2 0.0  91.9 91.9 91.9 92.3 89.0 89.8  88.5  46.1 78.4
Standard deviation   19.5  18.0  18.2 1.6  19.2 17.6 16.9 28.3 19.3 17.8 17.5 14.2 14.8
Mean 45.9  59.4  53.7 0.8  50.5 61.4 58.5 14.0 48.2 60.4  56.1  7.4  43.0
The calculated numbers represent the percentage of committed sectors in the total, weighted by the type 
of binding (full, partial, unbound). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
For comparison purposes it is helpful to start with mapping the commitments of the 
transition economies to those of the EU-15. New EU member states’ do not phase out or replace 
their national GATS schedules. The current EU schedule affects in principle only the EU-12; for 
the other member states the national schedules are, and remain, in force until a new EU-25 
schedule has been negotiated. Sector-specific agreements (finance, telecom) were incorporated 
into the EU schedule, even though they affect the EU-15. As the EU schedule is very 
heterogeneous in any event, a phasing in of new member states is not required. Among the EU 
accession countries Latvia is the only one that went beyond the level of EU commitments, in 
particular in mode 4 for national treatment. On average, Latvia’s GATS schedule is comparable 
to the EU Doha offer in 2004, implying a commitment index of about 58 percent. Noteworthy is 
that three of the four countries in group (d) – none of which are EU accession candidates – 
exceed the average Uruguay Round EU commitment level. One country, Moldova, has already 
made commitments that go beyond those offered by the EU in the Doha round as of 2003-4.  
Table 4 summarizes the patterns in the commitments made by the 16 transition 
economies. Four interesting results emerge. First, among the EU accession countries, countries   10
that were not members of the GATT in 1994 seem to have done a lot more in terms of making 
commitments than the countries that were GATT members – the average commitment index is 
more than 12 percentage points higher. Poland’s limited use of the GATS as a commitment 
device is particularly striking. Second, within the set of potential EU accession candidates, there 
is a lot of heterogeneity, with the Baltic States and some of the former Yugoslav republics 
revealing a strong interest in committing themselves in the GATS, but others such as Romania 
and Bulgaria doing much less. Third, post-1995 members of the WTO make more extensive 
commitments in the GATS than members of the GATT-1994. Fourth, many of the former Soviet 
republics, including three in Central Asia/Caucasus, appear to be highly committed to 
liberalization. The average commitment index of these countries is the highest across the 
transition economies. This is the case both for EU accession candidates (the Baltic states) and 
those that are not (group (d)). 
 
Table 4. Indices and Rankings of Countries Based on the Commitment Index 
Group (a) 
EU accession in 2004, 








South Eastern Europe, 





not potential EU 
candidates 
Country Index  Country Index  Country Index  Country    Index 
Hungary 44.4 Latvia  59.1  Croatia 49.3  Moldova  78.4 
Slovak Rep.  31.6  Lithuania  46.7  Macedonia, FYR  42.1  Kyrgyz Rep.  59.3 
Czech  Rep. 30.8  Estonia  44.3  Romania  25.0 Georgia 53.5 
Poland  24.5  Slovenia 31.1  Bulgaria  26.4 Armenia 41.9 
Average 32.8  Average 45.3  Average  35.7 Average 58.3 
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
Thus, the data suggest that new WTO members do more than old ones and that EU 
accession status does not imply a country will make deeper GATS commitments. These findings 
raise a number of questions. First, what is the relationship between the GATS 
schedules/commitments and actual policies of the countries concerned? Do countries with little 
revealed interest in making deeper GATS commitments use discriminatory trade-related policies, 
or do they simply want to reserve the right to remain unconstrained with respect to their policy 
choices? Second, presumably the EU is taking the lead in the case of EU accession candidates – 
i.e., it may be that these countries do not “need” the GATS as they use EU accession as the focal   11
point for reforms. Is this the case? And, if so, what explains the divergence across EU accession 
candidates in the depth of GATS commitments? 
 
3. GATS Commitments and Actual Policies 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are two rationales in the literature for the existence of 
trade agreements. The market access explanation is that agreements are a way of internalizing 
the spillovers that are created by other countries’ policies. This rationale emphasizes the terms of 
trade consequences of policies. The domestic political economy explanation puts the stress on 
the fact that trade agreements can be a vehicle for overcoming domestic resistance to desirable 
reforms (independent of any terms of trade rationale) and locking in such reforms (enhancing the 
credibility of reform). Given the small size of most transition economies the second explanation 
is more likely to apply. However, in assessing possible explanations for the observed pattern of 
GATS commitments, account needs to be taken of explanatory factors such as geographic 
proximity to a large market (the European Union), the size of the economy, and engagement in 
the EU accession process. Countries may have a greater incentive to use the GATS as a signaling 
and commitment device if they are small, geographically distant from large markets, and lack 
any prospect of joining the EU. In assessing the determinants of GATS commitments it is 
necessary to have an understanding of the actual policies applied by countries and the evolution 
in these policies. 
What follows begins with an aggregate analysis of the extent to which GATS 
commitments by the four country groups match actual policies. The analysis is not a one-to-one 
comparison of commitments and practice in sub sector x or y. Our objective is simply to focus on 
the question whether GATS commitments help ‘lock in’ a broader reform agenda and are a good 
signal for actual policies or policy direction. Figure 1 reports data on the “quality” of actual 
service sector policies and reforms in the four country groups. The policy indices used were 
constructed by the EBRD and range from 1 to 4.3, with higher numbers implying a stronger 
commitment to reform (better policies). The Annex to this paper summarizes the criteria that 
qualify countries for the top score. Essentially the index measures the success of policy on the 
basis of privatization of state-owned monopolies, liberalization, and progress in implementing a 
supporting legal, institutional and regulatory framework. Thus, the indices used do not allow a 
direct comparison with GATS commitments, as the set of policies is different. The data span the   12
period 1990-2004. The country scores are averages across a larger number of service sector 
activities (see Annex). The data used in figure 1 are averages of the country scores over time at 
the group level. They are subject to limitations in that they do not cover all service sectors and 
are somewhat arbitrary due to a certain amount of subjectivity associated with the EBRD 
assessment of sectoral policies (these are based on small sample surveys of practitioners in each 
country). They do, however, give a reasonable impression of the reform agenda put in place in 
these countries. In terms of policy, group (a) has consistently performed best over the whole 
transition period, followed by groups (b), (c), and (d), in that order.  
Figure 1. The Time Path of Service Sector Reform in Transition Economies 


















Source: EBRD (2004).  
 
If, however, we rank the country groups on the basis of GATS commitments, the ranking 
of groups (a) and (d) is reversed, while the ranking of groups (b) and (c) remains unchanged 
(Table 5). That is, the non-Baltic ex-Soviet Union members in the sample, despite having made 
among the deepest GATS commitments, are the countries that score the lowest in terms of the 
quality of actual service sector policies. This finding also holds if we do not use the average 
EBRD index of actual policy – which may be “biased” insofar as these are countries where 
reform may have started late, and, as noted above, they acceded to the WTO towards the end of 
the 1990s or later. If we use the 2004 EBRD index instead of the average over time, the same 
finding obtains. Comparing the averages with the most recent EBRD scores reveals that there is   13
divergence between the country groups in the sense that the difference between the index for 
groups (d) and (a) in 2004 is greater than it is for the whole period. Thus, there is divergence in 
actual policy over time. 
 















1  Group (d)  58.3  Group (a)  2.68  3.44 
2  Group (b)  45.3  Group (b)  2.41  3.19 
3  Group (c)  35.7  Group (c)  2.01  2.85 
4  Group (a)  32.8  Group (d)  1.70  2.24 
Source: EBRD (2004) and authors calculations based on GATS schedules.  
 
There is, of course, also heterogeneity within the 4 country groups, especially groups (a) 
and (c) (Figure 2). Therefore we also present a ranking of all countries jointly, using the same 
data as in table 5, which takes account of the information hidden by the averages (see also Annex 
Table 4). Rather than discuss the results for all countries, in what follows we examine some of 
the more interesting and extreme cases. In line with its GATS commitments, Hungary is the 
“frontrunner” in group (a) in terms of applied policy, as measured by the EBRD indices. This is 
consistent with Hungary’s GATS commitments. However, Poland, with the fewest GATS 
commitments in group (a) has services policies that are ranked only second to those of Hungary 
by the EBRD. The four countries in group (b) are all very similar in terms of actual policy 
performance. Estonia has the highest ranking in terms of applied policies, even though it made 
the fewest commitments of the three Baltic States. Latvia’s relatively strong use of the GATS is 
not reflected in its relative ranking in actual policy. In group (c), Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania 
follow more or less the same policy path, while FYR Macedonia has been lagging since the mid-
1990s. This contrasts with the picture painted by the GATS commitments, where Bulgaria and 
Romania did very little and Macedonia, FYR in contrast made more extensive commitments. 
GATS commitments and practice thus seem to be reversed for these three countries. Croatia is 
the outlier, in that it performs well in terms of both GATS commitments and applied policy. The 
poor policy performance of all four countries in group (d) is striking. Compared to the other 
transition economies in the sample, these countries have made the least progress in putting in 
place better services policies. The actual policy performance – uniformly limited – contrasts with 
the much greater divergences in GATS commitment. Moreover, the relatively ambitious GATS   14
commitments of all four countries are not reflected in good policies or better performance over 
time. Annex Table 4 confirms the analysis and identifies Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia as 
particularly striking examples of “better theory than practice”, whereas it does the reverse for 
Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 2. Time Path of Service Sector Reform, 1990–2004, by Country  
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Source: EBRD (2004). 
 
Table 6 ranks countries – not groups – according to their GATS commitment index and 
reports their most recent EBRD index score as well as the average EBRD score for the period as 
a whole (1990-2004). The numbers in parentheses following each of the EBRD columns are the 
rankings based on the average and most recent EBRD scores, respectively. These rankings do not 
differ across the two EBRD measures, with the exception of group (a).  Comparing the 2004 and   15
the average EBRD columns reveal a difference between groups (a) and (b) and groups (c) and 
(d). In the first two groups there is convergence in that the difference between the highest and 
lowest ranked countries has declined over time. For groups (c) and (d) the opposite holds – there 
is divergence, largely reflecting the weak ‘performance’ of Macedonia, FYR and Kyrgyzstan.  
 



















Group (a)             
Hungary 3.8  (1)  3.1 (1)  1994  1991  0.61 
Slovak Republic  3.1  (3)  2.1 (4)  1994  1995  0.39 
Czech Republic  3.4  (2)  2.6 (3)  1994  1993  0.50 
Poland 3.4  (2)  2.9 (2)  1994  1995  0.45 
Group (b)             
Latvia 3.11  (3)  2.30 (3)  1999  1994  0.95 
Lithuania 3.05  (4)  2.19 (4)  2001 1995  0.67 
Estonia 3.44  (1)  2.68 (1)  1999  1993  0.45 
Slovenia 3.17  (2)  2.47 (2)  1995  1998  0.44 
Group (c)             
Croatia 3.17  (1)  2.21 (1)  2000  1994  0.56 
Macedonia, FYR  2.22  (4)  1.82 (4)  2004  2000  0.22 
Romania 2.94  (3)  1.96 (3)  1994 1998  0.39 
Bulgaria 3.06  (2)  2.08 (2)  1997  1999  0.33 
Group (d)             
Moldova 2.33  (2)  1.80 (2)  2001 1997  0.44 
Kyrgyz Rep.  1.94  (4)  1.56 (4)  1999  1994  0.33 
Georgia 2.28  (3)  1.62 (3)  2000  1997  0.50 
Armenia 2.39  (1)  1.82 (1)  2004  1995  0.33 
 
 
Table 6 also provides information on the correlation between timing of WTO 
commitments and actual policy (reform) measures. In group (a), for instance, Hungary saw a 
large increase in its reform index in 1991, much before its GATS schedule was submitted. For 
the other three countries there is greater coincidence of GATS and policy implementation, 
regardless of how much they committed to in the GATS. The Baltic countries are similar to 
Hungary in taking major reform steps before their GATS schedules took effect. The opposite is 
true for Slovenia, where the policy stance improved after the GATS commitments were made. 
Even though the magnitude of changes in policy differs between Croatia and Macedonia, both 
pursued reforms before their GATS schedules were submitted, whereas the opposite holds for   16
Bulgaria and Romania (the latter being a GATT-1947 member). The countries in group (d) all 
have in common that they undertook reforms in the mid-1990s and have done little since then. 
The fact that they made far-reaching commitments in the GATS subsequent to their initial 
reforms had no impact on their apparent willingness or ability to move further in terms of policy 
reforms in the areas captured by the EBRD indices. 
 
Assessment 
The foregoing suggests that the 16 transition countries can be divided into three overlapping, 
non-exclusive categories. The first spans countries that have the prospect of accession to the EU. 
All such countries are in practice more open than their GATS commitments suggest. These 
countries do not need the GATS as a liberalization device. The fact that on average their policy 
performance is inversely related to their GATS commitments suggests that they relied on other 
mechanisms, in particular the EU acquis communautaire, as a focal point and lock-in 
mechanism. However, the large differences across the countries concerned in the extent of their 
GATS commitments may provide information on the “type” of government and the perceived 
need or desire to signal this to the markets. The EU accession countries that did the most through 
the GATS – Hungary and the Baltic states – are also among the transition countries that have 
attracted the largest inflows of FDI relative to their GDP or overall investment, including in 
services (Eschenbach and Hoekman, 2006). Their use of the GATS suggests there was perceived 
additionality in making commitments in the WTO, despite the high probability of accession to 
the EU (a probability that was probably seen to be lower by the markets for the Baltic states in 
the 1990s than for Hungary). 
The second group is composed of countries that are relatively open in “theory” (as 
revealed by their GATS indices) and practice (as measured by the EBRD indices). They may or 
may not need the GATS because of EU accession status – many of the countries in this category 
are accession countries – but one commonality many of the countries in this category have is that 
with the exception of Hungary they were not members of the GATT-1947. The WTO accession 
process is much more demanding for new entrants than it is on incumbents in terms of pressure 
to make commitments (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). This may help explain the greater 
alignment between actual policy indices and the level of GATS commitments.   17
The third group is composed of countries that have services policies that are of lower 
quality than they would appear to be on the basis of GATS commitments. This group includes 
Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and the FYR Macedonia. These countries 
have no or little chance of joining the EU in the near future. With the exception of Macedonia, 
they are geographically or culturally distant from the EU, have small markets, and were not 
GATT members in 1994. For these countries the GATS appears to have been either a failure – in 
not helping to promote improvements in services policies – or irrelevant in the sense that 
commitments were made that governments either did not intend to implement or could 
implement without resulting in a significant change in actual policies.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the observed disconnect between 
relatively extensive GATS commitments of non-EU accession countries and limited progress on 
actual reform. One possibility is that the intention was simply to “join the WTO club” rather than 
to pursue or reinforce domestic reforms. While this might be part of the explanation, a 
comparison of rankings based on the apparent depth of GATS commitments and the average 
level at which the countries concerned bound their goods tariffs reveals that the (non-EU 
candidate) countries with high levels of GATS commitments tend to have the lowest average 
level of bound tariffs (Table 7). This suggests there was a desire to “use” the WTO as a 
commitment and signaling device.  
 









Ranked by GATS 
commitment index 
1 Moldova  5.5 Moldova 78.4 
2 Croatia  5.8  Kyrgyz Republic 59.3 
3 Georgia  7.2  Georgia  53.5 
4 Kyrgyz  Republic  7.4  Croatia  49.3 
5 Armenia  8.5  Armenia  41.9 
6  Bulgaria   24.2  Bulgaria   26.4 
7 Romania  40.4  Romania  25 
Note:  The average tariff is the most recent simple average of all tariff bindings. The countries selected 
exclude those that joined the EU. Data on tariff bindings were not available for Macedonia. 
Sources: Based on UNCTAD TRAINS and WTO IDB database 
 
Another explanation is that in practice the political economy resistance to reform proved 
too great. In the latter case it may be that the GATS was too weak to help governments overcome 
such resistance, assuming they desired to, or too weak to help constituencies in these countries to   18
hold governments that did not desire to pursue reforms accountable for implementation of 
national commitments. Whatever the reason may be, an implication is that the WTO may not be 
doing enough to assist governments to apply commitments. 
There are two vehicles through which the WTO provides enforcement “assistance:” 
dispute settlement and transparency. The first offers an instrument for foreign suppliers to defend 
negotiated market access and other disciplines. The second is an instrument to flag potential 
implementation issues to internal constituencies in a WTO member as well foreign export 
interests. GATS commitments are binding. If trading partners perceive that a government is not 
living up to specific commitments, they can invoke WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. To 
date, no cases have been brought to the WTO against the countries concerned.  This may be 
because these countries are actually in compliance with their commitments. If so, it is clear from 
the trends in actual policy as reflected in the EBRD indices that GATS commitments are a rather 
weak reed on which to base claims of lock-in or credibility. Alternatively, the lack of dispute 
settlement activity may be due to the very small markets involved. These countries attract few 
foreign suppliers for reasons that may have nothing to do with services policies (e.g., market 
size, political uncertainty and instability). Even if governments are violating commitments, the 
small size of their markets greatly reduces the incentives to initiate formal dispute settlement 
cases.  
The limited incentive to pursue disputes against small countries implies that internal 
(domestic) enforcement of national GATS commitments by affected constituencies must be the 
primary vehicle to ensure implementation. This in turn suggests more attention be given to 
multilateral surveillance and monitoring of compliance and implementation of commitments, so 
as to assist domestic groups through the generation of information. Greater multilateral 
transparency may also help increase the perceived relevance of the GATS to stakeholders in 
small counties that have to date made only limited use of the GATS. It is noteworthy in this 
connection that the WTO Trade Policy Review mechanism has not yet generated reports on the 
relevant countries (i.e. group (d)) so far, i.e., the countries where such multilateral monitoring is 
most needed. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Given the increasing importance of the service sector, it is not surprising that services policies 
have become a prominent element of trade negotiations, both regional and multilateral. The   19
GATS is the primary multilateral instrument that can be used to improve access to markets and 
lock in (promote) pro-competitive services policy reforms. The ability of the GATS to promote 
liberalization on a reciprocal basis has been questioned in the literature (see, for example, 
Hoekman and Messerlin 2000). There are strong forces that should support unilateral policy 
reform efforts, and reciprocity within services may be hard to obtain. Small countries in 
particular may have little to offer. Clearly, however, there can be (and is) resistance to domestic 
reform. Making commitments in trade agreements can be used to overcome such opposition. 
  This commitment or lock-in argument for trade agreements is often used by proponents 
of such international cooperation. In the services/WTO context, transition economies have been 
among the WTO members that have made the most extensive GATS commitments. The wide 
discrepancies between rankings based on GATS commitments and actual policies that were 
found in this paper suggest that the commitment and signaling rationales for multilateral trade 
agreements may need to be qualified. Some transition countries appear not to have used the 
GATS for credibility/lock-in purposes because of the availability of an alternative – the prospect 
of EU accession. This no doubt helps to explain the low level of commitments made in the WTO 
by a number of accession candidates and the apparent disconnect between GATS commitments 
and actual policies. However, even within the set of potential accession countries there is a wide 
divergence in terms of the depth and coverage of GATS schedules. This implies that there is 
information to be extracted from the level of GATS commitments: deeper commitments can be 
used as a signaling device. This is important even for EU accession candidates as the EU is an 
incomplete common market when it comes to services trade and investment policy. At the 
margin this may provide additional incentives to make additional commitments in the GATS for 
signaling purposes. 
While the EU accession explanation for the discrepancy between actual policies and 
GATS commitments helps to resuscitate the theoretical rationale for trade agreements, most 
countries do not have any prospect of joining the EU or a similar deep integration arrangement. 
Mechanisms like the GATS are then potentially much more important in helping governments 
that desire this to pursue and lock in reforms. The fact that the rank order of countries changes 
when EBRD policy performance rather than GATS commitments is used suggests that either the 
WTO enforcement mechanisms are ineffective or GATS commitments are simply not very 
useful or relevant in helping to improve services trade and investment policies. Either   20
explanation is worrisome. Determining whether and which of these two possible explanations 
applies in each of the countries concerned is beyond the scope of this paper, but is clearly an 
important question for further research.  
It should be stressed that the differences in the content of the coverage of the two indices 
used make our findings merely suggestive. Clearly much more research and effort to “map” 
actual policies is required. For example, it is not clear whether our finding is a reflection of the 
methodology underlying the indices used, noncompliance with multilateral commitments, or the 
limited commercial relevance of the type of commitments that are required under the GATS. 
With the information available it is not possible to go beyond identifying the questions. 
However, insofar as our finding is not simply a reflection of the underlying data weaknesses that 
affect the level and change over time of the indices, there may be significant limitations to the 
relevance of the WTO for small (poor) countries as a commitment device. An element of a 
possible solution could be to devote more attention and resources to multilateral monitoring of 
compliance with commitments, the actual policies that are applied and their effects.  
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Annex  
 
The EBRD Services Reform Indices 
 
The index ranges from 1(little progress) to 4.3 (most advanced implementation of reform 
agenda) and has been compiled on an annual basis for the 1990-2004 period. The index used to 
measure service sector reform is the average of the following components: 
•  Banking and interest rate liberalization:  4.3 means full convergence of banking laws and 
regulations with BIS standards, provision of full set of competitive banking services. 
•  Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions: 4.3 means full convergence of 
securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards, fully developed non-bank 
intermediation. 
•  Electric power: 4.3 means Tariffs cost-reflective and provide adequate incentive for 
efficiency improvements. Large-scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and 
well-regulated sector. Fully liberalized sector with well-functioning arrangements for 
network access and full competition in generation. 
•  Railways: 4.3 means separation of infrastructure from operations and freight from 
passenger operations.  
Full divestment and transfer of asset ownership implemented or planned, including 
infrastructure and rolling stock. Rail regulator established and access pricing 
implemented. 
•  Roads: 4.3 means fully decentralized road administration. Commercialized road 
maintenance operations competitively awarded to private companies. Road user charges 
reflect the full costs of road use and associated factors, such as congestion, accidents and 
pollution. Widespread private sector participation in all aspects of road provision. Full 
public consultation on new road projects. 
•  Telecommunications: 4.3 means there is effective regulation through and independent 
entity. Coherent regulatory and institutional framework to deal with tariffs, 
interconnection rules, licensing, concession fees and spectrum allocation. Consumer 
ombudsman function. 
•  Water and waste water: 4.3 means water utilities fully decentralized and commercialized. 
Fully autonomous regulator exists with complete authority to review and enforce tariff 
levels and quality standards. Widespread private sector participation via 
service/management/lease contracts. High-powered incentives, full concessions and/or 
divestiture of water and waste-water services in major urban areas. 
 
Source : EBRD Transition Report, 2004.  
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Annex Table 1. Classification of GATS Commitments  
GATS terminology  Weights used to construct Commitment Index 
None 1=full  commitment 
None, except specific services or provisions 
 
0.5=Partial 




Unbound, except as indicated in horizontal 
section, plus textual description of bound 
commitments  0.5=Partial 
Unbound, due to lack of technical feasibility, 
except specific services 
 
0.5=Partial 
Textual description of bound commitments  0.5=Partial 
Unbound 0=Unbound 
Unbound, except as indicated in horizontal 
section 0=Unbound 
Unbound, due to lack of technical feasibility 
 
0=Unbound 
Sector not mentioned in schedule  
 
0=Unbound 
Source: Author’s definitions. 
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1=none
0.5=partial
sum as share of maximum=commitment index (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Services 73.9 88.0 88.0 0.0 73.9 89.1 89.1 0.0 69.6 88.0 85.9 1.1 69.6 89.1 89.1 3.3 71.7 85.9 82.6 3.3 67.4 87.0 88.0 2.2 72.8 88.0 85.9 6.5 72.8 89.1 83.7 7.6
Communication Services 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Distribution Services 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Educational Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Financial Services 100.0 100.0 97.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 97.1 100.0 85.3 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 97.1 94.1 97.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 91.2 91.2 94.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 11.8
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 62.5 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0
Transport Services 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 1.4 10.0 28.6 24.3 1.4
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 52.6 68.1 67.1 0.0 52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0 51.0 68.1 64.2 0.3 51.0 68.4 67.4 1.0 51.6 66.8 65.5 1.0 50.3 67.7 67.1 0.6 51.3 67.1 65.8 2.6 51.9 68.4 65.8 3.9
Business Services 73.9 88.0 73.9 3.3 73.9 89.1 89.1 0.0 69.6 87.0 78.3 8.7 70.7 89.1 88.0 3.3 64.1 88.0 88.0 12.0 64.1 89.1 89.1 0.0 62.0 88.0 71.7 6.5 62.0 89.1 89.1 16.3
Communication Services 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 29.2 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 29.2 58.3 29.2 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 40.0 40.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Distribution Services 60.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 20.0 50.0 80.0 70.0 30.0 50.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 40.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 50.0 80.0 80.0 20.0
Educational Services 80.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 50.0 80.0 80.0 30.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 70.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 50.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Financial Services 88.2 100.0 82.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 11.8 97.1 97.1 85.3 2.9 100.0 100.0 97.1 0.0 100.0 94.1 55.9 26.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 94.1 97.1 76.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 94.1 20.6
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 12.5 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 62.5 75.0 62.5 12.5 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 25.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 62.5 25.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 37.5 75.0 50.0 12.5 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 10.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 0.0
Transport Services 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 51.0 68.1 59.7 1.3 52.3 68.4 67.4 1.9 49.4 67.4 57.1 6.5 50.6 68.4 66.5 1.0 45.2 67.4 56.1 9.0 49.4 68.4 66.8 0.0 46.8 67.7 57.4 2.9 47.1 68.4 66.5 7.7
Business Services 69.6 88.0 84.8 0.0 69.6 89.1 89.1 0.0 73.9 88.0 88.0 0.0 73.9 89.1 89.1 0.0 73.9 88.0 88.0 0.0 73.9 89.1 89.1 0.0 63.0 88.0 72.8 6.5 63.0 89.1 88.0 12.0
Communication Services 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 29.2 58.3 29.2 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Distribution Services 70.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 20.0
Educational Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Financial Services 94.1 100.0 76.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 97.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 97.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 97.1 97.1 52.9 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 37.5 75.0 50.0 12.5 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 10.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0
Transport Services 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 11.4 28.6 25.7 1.4 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 50.6 68.1 63.5 0.0 51.0 68.4 67.4 0.0 52.6 68.1 66.8 0.0 52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0 52.6 68.1 66.8 0.0 52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0 43.5 67.7 51.0 2.9 49.0 68.4 67.1 4.2
Business Services 73.9 88.0 85.9 0.0 73.9 89.1 89.1 0.0 84.8 93.5 83.7 20.7 77.2 93.5 87.0 20.7 76.1 82.6 75.0 2.2 75.0 82.6 77.2 5.4 75.0 80.4 73.9 1.1 76.1 80.4 79.3 78.3
Communication Services 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 62.5 62.5 62.5 0.0 62.5 62.5 62.5 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Distribution Services 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
Educational Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 87.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Financial Services 100.0 97.1 94.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 91.2 91.2 79.4 0.0 91.2 91.2 100.0 11.8 91.2 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 73.5 0.0 88.2 100.0 67.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 88.2 0.0
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 62.5 12.5 0.0 75.0 75.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 50.0 75.0 62.5 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 62.5 12.5 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 50.0 60.0 30.0 10.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Transport Services 11.4 28.6 25.7 0.0 10.0 28.6 24.3 0.0 14.3 17.1 20.0 0.0 14.3 17.1 17.1 0.0 2.9 17.1 11.4 0.0 1.4 17.1 12.9 0.0 8.6 25.7 22.9 0.0 7.1 25.7 24.3 17.1
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 52.6 67.7 66.1 0.0 52.3 68.4 67.4 0.0 55.8 68.7 64.8 8.7 53.5 68.7 67.7 10.0 47.4 60.0 50.0 0.6 48.1 60.0 53.5 1.9 51.3 58.7 52.3 0.6 52.6 58.7 56.8 36.1
Source: Own assessment
Note: Figures reflect percentage of committed sectors in total weighted by type of binding (full, partial)
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Annex Table 2. Sectoral Breakdown of Currently Applicable GATS Commitments of EU15
Spain France Greece Italy
Market Access National Treatment Market Access National Treatment
Denmark EU Belgium Germany
Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply
National Treatment Market Access Market Access National Treatment  24
1=none
0.5=partial
sum as share of maximum=commitment index (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Services 44.6 54.3 40.2 1.1 45.7 54.3 46.7 2.2 65.2 78.3 77.2 4.3 78.3 78.3 78.3 0.0 32.6 34.8 30.4 5.4 34.8 37.0 37.0 35.9 46.7 54.3 41.3 0.0 47.8 56.5 48.9 0.0
Communication Services 62.5 66.7 52.1 0.0 62.5 66.7 66.7 0.0 45.8 62.5 58.3 0.0 50.0 62.5 62.5 0.0 35.4 35.4 20.8 0.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 4.2 62.5 66.7 52.1 0.0 62.5 66.7 66.7 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Distribution Services 50.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 30.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 0.0
Educational Services 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 40.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0
Financial Services 35.3 44.1 41.2 0.0 88.2 88.2 88.2 0.0 94.1 94.1 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 14.7 14.7 35.3 23.5 17.6 17.6 70.6 70.6 38.2 47.1 47.1 0.0 94.1 94.1 82.4 0.0
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.0 12.5 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 0.0 75.0 62.5 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 12.5 37.5 50.0 0.0 12.5 37.5 50.0 50.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transport Services 0.0 22.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 22.9 1.4 0.0 18.6 30.0 24.3 0.0 31.4 31.4 31.4 0.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 0.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 0.0 28.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 28.6 1.4 0.0
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 31.6 48.7 31.9 0.3 38.1 53.5 41.6 0.6 50.6 61.0 58.1 1.3 60.0 61.9 61.9 0.0 21.0 26.5 26.5 4.5 23.5 29.0 35.2 30.0 32.6 50.3 33.2 0.0 38.7 56.1 41.6 0.0
Business Services 62.0 65.2 59.8 0.0 59.8 65.2 57.6 0.0 71.7 78.3 73.9 4.3 71.7 80.4 80.4 80.4 77.2 80.4 71.7 0.0 77.2 80.4 76.1 2.2 46.7 56.5 52.2 1.1 48.9 56.5 55.4 1.1
Communication Services 66.7 66.7 66.7 0.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 0.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 0.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 70.8 70.8 70.8 0.0 70.8 70.8 70.8 0.0 20.8 25.0 14.6 0.0 20.8 25.0 25.0 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 20.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Distribution Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 20.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Educational Services 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 40.0 0.0
Environmental Services 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 62.5 100.0 100.0 0.0 62.5 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Financial Services 91.2 94.1 94.1 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 0.0 26.5 94.1 88.2 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.1 79.4 94.1 58.8 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 0.0 47.1 55.9 52.9 0.0 82.4 88.2 91.2 0.0
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 37.5 0.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 12.5 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 25.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 25.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 37.5 37.5 0.0 0.0 37.5 37.5 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 50.0 37.5 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 12.5 50.0 37.5 0.0 12.5 50.0 50.0 12.5
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 0.0 80.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 40.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0
Transport Services 21.4 21.4 21.4 0.0 21.4 21.4 21.4 0.0 31.4 60.0 54.3 0.0 31.4 60.0 57.1 54.3 11.4 40.0 32.9 0.0 11.4 40.0 34.3 0.0 11.4 22.9 22.9 0.0 8.6 22.9 20.0 0.0
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 57.1 62.9 59.0 0.0 56.8 62.6 54.2 1.9 50.6 73.2 70.0 1.6 58.1 73.5 73.2 72.3 53.9 68.7 60.3 0.0 55.5 68.4 65.5 1.6 30.3 45.2 41.6 0.3 34.8 48.7 47.4 0.6
Business Services 66.3 79.3 75.0 1.1 75.0 80.4 78.3 0.0 65.2 77.2 65.2 0.0 66.3 77.2 68.5 0.0 39.1 51.1 45.7 3.3 42.4 51.1 50.0 0.0 23.9 23.9 21.7 0.0 23.9 23.9 21.7 0.0
Communication Services 66.7 66.7 66.7 0.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 0.0 68.8 70.8 68.8 0.0 70.8 70.8 70.8 0.0 37.5 47.9 33.3 2.1 47.9 50.0 47.9 2.1 62.5 62.5 62.5 0.0 62.5 62.5 62.5 29.2
Construction and related engineering services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 50.0 30.0 10.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
Distribution Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 10.0 80.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 80.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Educational Services 50.0 80.0 70.0 0.0 50.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Environmental Services 12.5 100.0 62.5 0.0 12.5 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Financial Services 58.8 52.9 91.2 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 0.0 29.4 64.7 52.9 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 0.0 17.6 11.8 41.2 14.7 17.6 23.5 50.0 0.0 41.2 41.2 67.6 0.0 47.1 52.9 79.4 82.4
Health Related and Social Services      50.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 75.0 100.0 87.5 0.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 50.0 50.0 12.5 25.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 20.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 50.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 30.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 60.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transport Services 18.6 57.1 48.6 0.0 18.6 57.1 57.1 0.0 8.6 31.4 25.7 0.0 11.4 31.4 25.7 0.0 4.3 15.7 15.7 0.0 5.7 17.1 17.1 0.0 2.9 11.4 8.6 0.0 2.9 11.4 10.0 8.6
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 49.0 70.6 68.7 0.3 55.5 74.8 74.5 0.6 41.6 62.3 54.2 0.0 52.6 64.8 61.0 0.6 21.3 38.4 35.5 4.8 26.1 41.0 42.6 1.3 25.2 30.3 31.9 0.0 25.8 31.6 33.5 21.9
Business Services 62.0 69.6 66.3 0.0 66.3 69.6 68.5 0.0 83.7 91.3 89.1 0.0 83.7 91.3 91.3 0.0 98.9 97.8 93.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.8 84.8 69.6 0.0 84.8 84.8 69.6 0.0
Communication Services 45.8 83.3 54.2 0.0 83.3 83.3 83.3 0.0 83.3 83.3 81.3 0.0 83.3 83.3 83.3 0.0 66.7 70.8 62.5 0.0 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 87.5 91.7 87.5 0.0 87.5 91.7 87.5 0.0
Construction and related engineering services 0.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Distribution Services 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Educational Services 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 40.0 80.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Environmental Services 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Financial Services 50.0 94.1 64.7 0.0 50.0 94.1 94.1 0.0 88.2 94.1 94.1 0.0 82.4 94.1 94.1 0.0 50.0 58.8 58.8 0.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.1 79.4 94.1 82.4 0.0 94.1 94.1 58.8 0.0
Health Related and Social Services      0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0
Tourism and Travel Related Services 50.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 50.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 50.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 50.0 75.0 75.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 50.0 60.0 60.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0
Transport Services 11.4 25.7 25.7 0.0 8.6 25.7 24.3 0.0 5.7 40.0 28.6 0.0 17.1 40.0 35.7 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 71.4 65.7 64.3 0.0 65.7 65.7 65.7 0.0
Other Services not Included Elsewhere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Sectors 40.0 64.5 55.8 0.0 46.5 64.5 63.9 0.0 62.6 76.8 73.2 0.0 64.5 76.8 74.2 0.0 86.1 87.7 85.2 0.0 91.9 91.9 91.9 92.3 80.3 82.6 74.5 0.0 80.6 82.6 73.5 0.0
Source: Own assessment
Note: Figures reflect percentage of committed sectors in total weighted by type of binding (full, partial)
Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply
Market Access National Treatment
Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply Mode of supply
Market Access National Treatment Market Access National Treatment Market Access National Treatment
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Armenia Georgia Moldova Kyrgystan
Estonia
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Annex Table 4. Openness Rankings of Country: GATS vs. Actual Practice 
Rank Country 
Ranked by average 
GATS commitment 
index  Country 
Ranked by average 
EBRD score 
1 Moldova  78.4  Hungary  3.1
2 Kyrgyz  Rep.  59.3  Poland  2.9
3 Latvia  59.1  Estonia  2.68
4 Georgia  53.5  Czech  Republic  2.6
5 Croatia  49.3  Slovenia  2.47
6 Lithuania  46.7  Latvia  2.3
7 Hungary  44.4  Croatia  2.21
8 Estonia  44.3  Lithuania  2.19
9  Macedonia, FYR  42.1  Slovak Republic  2.1
10 Armenia  41.9  Bulgaria  2.08
11 Slovak  Rep.  31.6  Romania  1.96
12 Slovenia  31.1  Macedonia,  FYR  1.82
13 Czech  Republic  30.8  Armenia  1.82
14 Bulgaria  26.4  Moldova  1.8
15 Romania  25  Georgia  1.62
16 Poland  24.5  Kyrgyz  Rep.  1.56
Source: EBRD (2004) and author’s calculations based on GATS schedules.  
 
 